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Abstract: Agent-based artificial stock markets attracted much attention over the last years, and many models have 
been proposed. However, among them, few models take into account the social interactions and mimicking 
behaviour of traders, while the economic literature describes investors on financial markets as influenced by 
decisions of their peers and explains that this mimicking behaviour has a decisive impact on price dynamics 
and market stability. In this paper we propose a continuous double auction model of financial market, 
populated by heterogeneous traders who interact through a social network of influence. Traders use different 
investment strategies, namely: fundamentalists who make a decisions based on the fundamental value of 
assets; hybrids who are initially fundamentalists, but switch to a speculative strategy when they detect an 
uptrend in prices; noise traders who don’t have sufficient information to take rational decisions, and finally 
mimetic traders who imitate the decisions of their mentors on the interactions network. An experimental 
design is performed to show the feasibility and utility of the proposed model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In financial market, traders can be influenced by 
decisions of their peers. This phenomenon is called 
herd (or mimetic) behaviour, and attracted much 
attention for several decades. The reason for this 
interest is that mimicking behaviour has a decisive 
impact on price dynamics, and it might offer an 
explanation of excessive volatility and creation of 
bubbles (e.g. (Manahov, 2013) and (Chang, 2014)).  
In the literature we distinguish three main 
reasons for mimicking behaviour to occur in 
financial markets, i.e., when a decision of an 
investor can be influenced by observing the actions 
of other investors: (1) incomplete information, (2) 
concern for reputation and (3) compensation 
structures (Bikhchandani, 2000). 
The information based models, such as in 
(Banerjee, 1992) and (Scharfstein, 1990 assume that 
individuals have private (but imperfect) information 
about the course of action, they can also observe 
each other’s actions but not the private information 
or signals that each player receives. Investors may 
consider optimal to follow the behaviour of the 
preceding individual disregarding his own 
information. Other models such as in (Chang, 2014), 
are based on herding caused by compensation. In 
fact, performance evaluation of a fund manager that 
invests for his employers is often based on relative 
(not absolute) performance, i.e., his compensation 
increases with his own performance, and decreases 
if he produces a performance below than other fund 
managers. This leads him to conform his investment 
decisions to those of other professionals, more than 
he would if he was acting on his own account. Also, 
reputational concerns of fund managers can also 
provide a motivation to be mimetic. Indeed, when 
managers take the same decisions, even if the result 
of the investment is poor, observers may conclude 
that there is a high probability that managers are of 
good quality and that the bad result is accidental. 
Thus, many proposed models are based on 
reputation concerns (Scharfstein, 1990).  
However, it is difficult to test those theoretical 
models directly (Manahov, 2013), because it is 
difficult to access at a time t to private information 
of traders, their investment strategies and 
interactions among them. Therefore, it is difficult to 
determine whether traders make similar decisions as 
they neglect their own information and imitate 
others, or because they have access to the same 
information they use to make their decisions.  
To overcome this problem, we can use artificial 
stock markets (ASM) which are computer models of 
real stock markets; they are based on modelling 
market actors by agents, and supposed have the 
essential properties of real financial markets with the 
aim of reproducing analyse or understand the 
dynamics of stock markets, and this by computing 
experiences (Derveeuw, 2007).  In literature, there is 
a little work that uses ASMs to study the 
phenomenon of mimicking behaviour on financial 
markets. In (Manahov, 2013), we propose the study 
of herd behaviour through the use of an artificial 
financial market, where the market is populated by 
agents who are with learning behaviour represented 
by the genetic programming algorithm. Therefore, as 
in real markets, authors use statistical measures of 
price series generated by the experiments to quantify 
mimicking behaviour on the market. This limits the 
ability of the model to study the phenomenon. 
In this paper we propose a continuous double 
auction ASM with heterogeneous traders. The 
proposed ASM is populated by heterogeneous 
traders which are bound by interaction network. 
Traders use different investment strategies, among 
them, the mimetic traders which are able to imitate 
the decisions of their successors in the interactions 
network. To test the model we perform a series of 
experiments, and we analyse their results. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents a description of the proposed model, in 
section 3 we perform a series of experiments and we 
discuss the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and 
outlines open research directions. 
2 STRUCTURE OF THE ASM 
In this section we introduce a continuous double 
auction model with heterogeneous traders. The 
proposed ASM has four main components (see 
Figure 1): (i) Market which allows buyers and 
sellers to exchange assets; (ii) Traders who exchange 
assets in the market; (iii) External-world that is the 
source of information used by traders to estimate the 
fundamental value of assets; and (iv) social network 
that allows traders to interact and learn about the 
decisions of their predecessors. 
2.1 The Market 
The role of Market is to receive and process orders 
placed by traders. An order submitted by one trader 
is described by a direction (buy or sell), a quantity of 
assets to buy or sell, and a quoted price. The quoted 
price of a buy (sell) order is the maximum 
(minimum) limit price above (under) which the 
order should not be executed. Unexecuted orders are 
placed in the order book. The order book is 
described by two lists, the list of buy orders, and the 
list of sell orders. The list of buy orders is arranged 
in decreasing order of prices, while the list of sell 
orders is arranged in increasing order. If a submitted 
order finds a matching order of the opposite side in 
the book, a trade is generated. When a trade is 
generated, the Market deletes satisfied orders from 
the order book, an orders can be satisfied completely 
or partially (depending on quantity), if order is 
satisfied partially, the unsatisfied order part is 
replaced in the book. 
 
Figure 1: The structure of an artificial stock market. 
2.2  External World 
The fundamental value of the asset is the expected 
discounted sum of its future dividends. It represents 
the true value of asset. To estimate it, analysts use 
information of external world, such as balance sheet 
of company and overall state of the economy. 
The role of External world is to generate the 
signal representing the fundamental value of asset 
that will be received by traders with an error margin. 
We will use two jump processes to simulate 
fundamental values. To generate fundamental value 
without trend, we use the following process: ܨݒሺݐ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ܨݒሺݐሻ ൅ ߱௧                            (1) 
Where ߱௧ ׾ ࣨሺͲǡ ߪሻ is a white noise from a 
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance ߪଶ= 1. 
To have an uptrend of prices over a period, and 
stimulate speculative behaviour of hybrid agents 
(see section 3.4), we will generate a fundamental 
value with increasing trend during the first݊ 
transactions, and without trend (equation 1) during 
the rest of simulation. To generate a fundamental 
value with increasing trend we use the following 
process: ܨݒሺݐ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ܨݒሺݐሻ ൅ ܾ ൅ ߱௧                       (2) ܾ ൐ Ͳ is a positive constant. 
2.3 Interactions Network 
To study the mimicking behaviour, we need to 
model the social network of interactions of traders in 
the market, through which, they can access to 
actions of each other, and eventually imitate them. 
Thus, the interactions network is represented by 
a directed graph, where the nodes represent the 
traders, while edges represent the interactions among 
them. The interactions are assumed unidirectional 
(i.e., agent j-th influences agent i-th, but the reverse 
isn't necessarily correct). Interactions are 
characterized by a weight ݓ௜ǡ௝, assumed a positive 
real number, and it represents the degree of 
confidence of trader i, in the decisions of trader j. 
To produce a realistic social network, we use the 
“small-world” model of Watts-and-Strogatz (Watts, 
1998). Creating a Watts-Strogatz network is carried 
out at two steps:  
(1) Create a ring network with N nodes; each 
node is connected to the same number k of nearest 
neighbours in the two sides.  
 (2) Remove each edge with uniform probability 
p and rewire it to one of nodes that are chosen 
uniformly at random. 
2.4 Traders 
The market is populated by traders who exchange 
(buy and sell) assets. According to the used strategy 
to make decision, we use different types of traders: 
2.4.1 Noise Traders 
Noise traders represent traders who don’t have 
sufficient access to information and/ or don’t have 
sufficient competence to use information in decision 
making. So, he makes a decision to submit a buy 
order, a sell order or wait with corresponding 
probabilities  ௕ܲ௨௬ǡ ௦ܲ௘௟௟ and ௪ܲ௔௜௧. 
2.4.2 Fundamentalist Traders 
Fundamentalists estimate the fundamental value of 
the asset with a small error margin, and use it to 
make decisions.  Thus, to make a decision, a 
fundamental trader i estimates a fundamental value ݂ݒ௜ሺݐሻ and compares it with current price in 
Market݌ሺݐሻ. If ݌ሺݐሻ ൏ ݂ݒ௜ሺݐሻ, trader i considers 
that assets are undervalued, and so decides to submit 
a buy order. If ݌ሺݐሻ ൐ ݂ݒ௜ሺݐሻ, he consider that asset 
is overestimated and he place a sell order. 
2.4.3 Hybrid Traders 
Hybrid traders are initially fundamentalists, but can 
switch to the speculative behaviour when they detect 
a sufficient uptrend in prices history and sufficient 
liquidity.  
A hybrid trader i stand initially in fundamental 
strategy. It has a desire ୧ሺሻ to become speculative, 
initialized by ୧. It continuously observes prices 
trend using moving average (equation 3) (Martinez, 
2009) and market liquidity with Effective Spread 
(୧ሺሻ) (Bessembinder, 2009) (equation 4). ܯܣሺܮǡ ݐሻ ൌ ௣ሺ௧ሻିቀభಽσ ௣ሺ௧ି௜ሻಽ೔సభ ቁభಽσ ௣ሺ௧ି௜ሻಽ೔సభ                          (3)     
t is the current time and L is a period length. ܧ ௜ܵሺݐሻ ൌ ௣ሺ௧ሻି௙௩೔ሺ௧ሻ௙௩೔ሺ௧ሻ                          (4)  ݌ሺݐሻ is the last price of asset at time t, ݂ݒ௜ሺݐሻ is 
the estimated fundamental value by trader i at time t. 
Once it observes a sufficient uptrend 
(ܯܣሺܮǡ ݐሻ ൐ ݐ݄ܯܣ௜) associated with sufficient 
liquidity (ܧ ௜ܵሺݐሻ ൏ ݐ݄ܧ ௜ܵ), it can switch to technical 
behaviour with a probability proportional to its 
desire ܦ௜ሺݐሻ. If it persists in fundamentalist 
behavior, it increases his desire of speculation ܦ௜ሺݐ ൅ ͳሻ as follows: ܦ௜ሺݐ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ܦ௜ሺݐሻ ൅ ߩ௜                         (5)     
When trader i adopts technical (speculative) 
strategy, he continuously observes prices trend and 
market liquidity. If price tends to decline ሺܯܣሺܮǡ ݐሻ ൏ െݐ݄ܯܣ௜ሻ or market liquidity is 
insufficient (ܧ ௜ܵሺݐሻ ൒ ݐ݄ܧ ௜ܵ), it return to the 
fundamental strategy. 
2.4.4 Mimetic Traders 
Mimetic traders represent traders who consider that 
their own information is incomplete to making 
decision, and take their decision by imitating others. 
A mimetic trader i can access to actions of its 
successors in the interaction network (see section 
3.3), thus, to make a decision, mimetic trader i 
imitates the last decision of one of its successor’s j. 
Imitated successor j is chosen using roulette-wheel 
selection, i.e., proportionally to the weights of 
interactions ݓ௜ǡ௝ which represents the degree of 
confidence of trader i in decisions of his successor j 
(see Figure 2.). Mimetic trader has a learning 
mechanism for updating weights of its interactions 
(see Figure 3); the aim is to foster imitation of 
predecessors who are able to make correct decisions 
based on the analysis of the price trend. Thus, each 
mimetic trader ݅ keeps the list  ܫ݉݅ݐܽݐ݁݀௜ of 
imitated decisions, to be able to evaluate them later, 
and thus updates the weights of its interactions with 
the imitated successors according to this evaluation.  
 
Figure 2: Make a decision algorithm of mimetic trader. 
An imitated decision can be described as a triplet  ݀ ൌ ሺݐݕ݌݁ௗ ǡ ݐௗǡ ݏݑܿܿௗሻ , while: ݐݕ݌݁ௗ is the type of 
imitated decision (buy or sell), ݐௗ the time when 
decision ݀ is imitated, and ݏݑܿܿௗ the imitated 
successor. To update the weights of interactions with 
imitated successors at time t, a mimetic trader i filter 
a list of evaluable decisions ܧݒ݈ܽݑܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜ሺݐሻ. An 
imitated decision is considered evaluable if the time 
since its imitation is greater than or equal to a 
duration  ȟ௜: ܧݒ݈ܽݑܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ሼ݀ א ܫ݉݅ݐܽݐ݁݀௜ሺݐሻȁݐ െ ݐௗ ൒ ȟ௜ሽ 
 Mimetic trader i retains for each interaction with 
trader j a value ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௝ that we call absolute weight; ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௝ is used to calculate the interaction weight ୧ǡ୨ with a sigmoid function as follows: ௜ܹǡ௝ ൌ ௪೘ೌೣଵା௔௘షೝכಲ್ೞೈ೔ǡೕ                         (6)     ݓ௠௔௫ a, r are positive real. 
Sigmoid function aims to obtain a weight with a 
quite slow slope in the beginning, followed by 
acceleration, and finally slows down and approaches ሺݓ௠௔௫ሻ. 
 
 
Figure 3: Algorithm for updating interactions weights. 
3 EXPERIMENTS & DISCUSSION 
We designed a model to study mimicking behaviour 
in stock markets. As mentioned in the introduction, 
herd behaviour has an important effect on asset 
prices in stock markets; it is considered as the first 
explanation of the phenomenon of speculative 
bubble formation ((Orléan, 1989) and (Chang, 
2014)). However, does the model give realistic 
prices dynamics? Also, are the mimetic traders 
designed able to cause mimetic contagion, and 
reproduce a realistic speculative bubble such as 
indicated in theoretical assumptions?  
3.1 Metrics and Tools 
To test the model, we will perform experiments and 
analyse the output price series, and the evolution of 
the state of traders and interactions network. In order 
to verify whether prices dynamics of our model are 
realists, we analyse statistic properties (mean, 
median, minimum, maximum, kurtosis and 
skewness) and we compare it with them of real price 
series. To see the formation of realistic bubbles, we 
observe measures introduced in experimental 
economics literature to analyse bubbles magnitude, 
which are the following: 
(1) Relative Deviation (RD), is the average deviation 
of prices from fundamental value relative to the 
average fundamental value (Stöckl, 2010). ܴܦ ൌ ଵ்σ ௉ሺ௧ሻିி௩ሺ௧ሻி௏തതതത௧்ୀଵ                          (7) 
Algorithm Make a decision  
Parameters: ܮܽݏݐܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊௜: The last decision tacked by trader i. ܮܽݏݐܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋ ௝݊: The last decision tacked by trader j. ௜ܹǡ௝: Weight of interaction between mimic trader i 
and imitated successor݆. ܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ௜: Strategy of trader i. ܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ௝: Strategy of trader j. 
Output: 
Decision (buy, sell) 
Select one successor j of trader i using roulette-wheel, 
proportionate to the weights of interactions ௜ܹǡ௝. ܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ௜ ൌ ܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ௝ ܮܽݏݐܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊௜ ൌ ܮܽݏݐܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋ ௝݊ 
if (ܮܽݏݐܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋ ௝݊ ൌ ܾݑݕ)  
       return buy order 
else (ܮܽݏݐܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋ ௝݊ ൌ ݏ݈݈݁) 
       return sell order 
end if 
Algorithm Update Interactions Weights 
Parameters: ܧݒ݈ܽݑܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜ሺݐሻ: List of evaluable decisions ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏: Weight of interaction with imitated ݏݑܿܿௗ ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏: Absolut weight of interaction between 
mimic trader and imitated successor ݏݑܿܿௗ ߛ: Rate used to update ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏. ߝ: Threshold used to determine if price has significantly 
increased or decreased. ݉ ՚ ሺ݌ሺݐሻ െ ݌ሺݐ െ ߂௜ሻሻȀ݌ሺݐ െ ߂௜ሻ 
for each ݀ א ܧݒ݈ܽݑܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜ሺݐሻ: 
if ሺݐݕ݌݁ௗ ൌ ܾݑݕሻ 
if ሺ݉ ൐ ߝሻ: ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ՚ ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ൅ ȁ݉ȁ; 
else ǣܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ՚ ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ െ ȁ݉ȁ; 
else /* ሺݐݕ݌݁ௗ ൌ ݏ݈݈݁ሻ*/ 
if ሺ݉ ൏ െߝሻǣܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ՚ ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ൅ ȁ݉ȁ; 
else: ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ՚ ܣܾݏ ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ െ ȁ݉ȁ;   ௜ܹǡ௦௨௖௖೏ ൌ ݇ͳ ൅ ܽ݁ି௥כ஺௕௦ௐ೔ǡೞೠ೎೎೏ 
delete decision ݀from ܧݒ݈ܽݑܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜ሺݐሻ 
end for 
(2) Boom Duration, which equals the greatest 
number of consecutive periods when prices 
increase relatively to fundamental value 
(Füllbrunn, 2012). 
(3) Bust Duration which is the greatest number of 
consecutive periods when prices decrease 
relatively to fundamental value (Füllbrunn, 
2012). 
(4) Positive Deviation (PD), a deviation of the price 
from the fundamental value if prices are above 
(below) fundamental value (Füllbrunn, 2012). ܲܦ ൌ σ ȁܲሺݐሻ െ ܨݒሺݐሻȁ௉ሺ௧ሻவி௏ሺ௧ሻ                     (8) 
(5) Negative Deviation (ND), defined as deviation of 
the price from the fundamental value if prices are 
below fundamental value (Füllbrunn, 2012). ܰܦ ൌ σ ȁܲሺݐሻ െ ܨݒሺݐሻȁܲሺݐሻ൏ܨܸሺݐሻ                    (9) 
A bubble is characterized as (1) the positive 
Relative Deviation (RD is not below or at zero), (2) 
long Boom Duration and short Burst Duration 
(Boom> Burst), and (3) high Positive Deviation and 
low Negative Deviation (PD>ND) (Füllbrunn, 
2012). Thus, to verify these properties, we will test 
the corresponding null hypothesis (i.e. (1)ܴܦ ൑ Ͳ, 
(2)ܤ݋݋݉ ൑ ܤݑݎݏݐ, and (3) ܲܦ ൑ ܰܦ).  
Also, given that the decisions of a mimetic trader 
are imitations of their successors, and that the choice 
of successor to imitate depends on the weights of its 
interactions with him (see Figure 2) thus, to be able 
to measure the influence of each type of traders on 
decisions of mimetic traders, we measure the 
average of interactions weights with each type of 
traders as follow: 
Let ݓଵ࣮ ǡ ݓଶ࣮ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݓ௫࣮  weights of interactions 
where: (1) predecessor is mimetic trader, (2) 
successor is a trader of type ࣮ which can be Noise, 
Fundamentalist, Hybrid, or Mimic, i.e. ࣮ אሼܰǡ ܨǡ ܪǡܯሽ. ݔ is the traders number of the type ࣮. 
ெܹ࣮തതതതത ൌ ଵ௫σ ݓ௔࣮௫௔ୀଵ                          (10) 
Thus, there will be four weight averages: ெܹேതതതതത, ெܹிതതതതത, ெܹுതതതതത and ெܹெതതതതത. 
Also, to better understand prices dynamic and 
trader’s behaviour, we will interest to the strategies 
used by traders to make a decisions on the market. 
For fundamentalist and noise traders, the strategy is 
obviously fundamentalist and noise respectively. For 
hybrid traders, strategy is the one used to take the 
last decision (technical or fundamentalist). For 
mimetic trader, strategy is the one used by imitated 
trader to make imitated decision (see Figure 2).   
Finally, we will use social networking 
visualization tools to visualize the evolution of the 
interactions of traders and their strategies. 
3.2 Experimental Settings 
Table 1 shows values for general model parameters 
of all performed experiments. Given the large 
number of model parameters, we content with relate 
only general parameters of the experiments, namely 
general parameters of market which have the same 
values in all experiments, and the same for the 
parameters of generated fundamental values. What 
will change in performed experiments are the 
proportions of different types of traders, except the 
noise traders that are set at 10% in all experiments, 
and whose role is to ensure market liquidity 
(Kobayashi, 2007). First, we test model with 
fundamentalists trading (EXP.1), after we will 
introduce hybrid traders (EXP.2).  Finally, we 
introduce the mimetic traders in EXP.3. The aim is 
to show that mimetic traders are able to cause a 
mimetic contagion of speculative behaviour and a 
deviation of prices from the fundamental value, in 
the same way as hybrid traders. 





Nbr. of transactions 2000 2000 2000 
Number of traders 500 500 500 
Open price 1000 1000 1000 
Proportions of 
traders 
Noise traders 10% 10% 10% 
Fundamental traders 90% 10% 10% 
Hybrid traders 0% 80% 10% 





Initial FV 1000 1000 1000 
b (eq. 2) 0,5 0,5 0,5 
n (section 2.2) 500 500 500 
3.3 Analyse of Results 
First, we will observe the statistical properties of the 
experiments and compared with two real price series 
(FTSE100 index and Barclays bank’s (Martinez, 
2009)). Table 2 shows that price series generated by 
our model have statistical properties that are close to 
the real series. For example, it has been found in real 
financial market, that prices series exhibit a kurtosis 
larger than three, which indicate a leptokurtic 
distribution of return.  This phenomenon is known as 
fat tails (Martinez, 2009). Thus, as real series, the 
series generated by experiments have a kurtosis 
larger than three, and so exhibit a phenomenon of fat 
tails.  
After having presented the statistical properties 
of performed experiments, now we will analyse and 
discuss results of each experiment regarding the 
dynamics of prices and its relationship with the 
behaviour of traders. 
Table 2: Statistical properties of log return in performed 
experiments. 
  Mean Median Min. Max. Kurtosis Skewness
FTSE100 -0,00003 0 -0,059 0,059 5,138 -0,130 
Barclays 0,00020 0 -0,090 0,094 4,626 0,113 
EXP.1 0,00017 0 -0,067 0,078 5,208 0,219 
EXP.2 0,0003 0 -0,035 0,041 9,509 0,586 
EXP.3 0,00019 0 -0,035 0,045 4,133 0,460 
3.3.1 Fundamental Trading 
In order to analyse prices dynamics with 
fundamentalist traders, we perform EXP.1, with 
population composed from 90% of fundamentalists 
and 10% of noises (see Table 1). We can see in 
Figure 4 that prices fluctuate around the fundamental 
value. In Table 3 RD=0.001 is close to 0, also, the 
test doesn’t reject a null hypothesis thatܴܦ ൑ Ͳ, 
which confirm that prices follow closely 
fundamental value (Füllbrunn, 2012). In fact, 
fundamentalist traders which represent the majority 
of traders submit orders with prices close to 
fundamental value, and thus prevent the deviation of 
prices from the fundamental. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of prices and FV in EXP.1. 
3.3.2 Introduction of Hybrid Traders 
We will observe price dynamics in the presence of 
hybrids that can switch between fundamentalist and 
speculative strategies. Are they able to cause a 
deviation of prices and the formation of bubble by 
their speculative behaviour as stated in the 
literature? 
In EXP.2 when population of traders is 
composed from 80% of hybrids and 10% of 
fundamentalists, we can see in Figure 5(a) the 
deviation of prices from fundamental value that 
takes the form of a bubble followed by a crash, also, 
the three null hypotheses was rejected, which 
indicates a deviation of prices from fundamental 
value with the magnitude of a bubble. In fact 
RD=0,194 is positive (see Table 3), which indicate 
that asset is overvalued. Also, Boom is higher than 
Burst and both durations are significantly higher 
compared to the number of periods (150).  ND=2k 
isn’t significant regarding PD=1043k, which 
confirms a positive deviation of prices from 
fundamental values. A formation of bubble in EXP.2 
can explain by the behaviour of hybrid traders which 
represent a majority in population. In fact, the 
switching of hybrid traders to technical strategy (see 
Figure 5(b)) led to a boom phase when prices 
increase and deviate from fundamental value, then 
return to the fundamentalist behaviour led to a burst 
phase when prices decrease and remain close to 
fundamental values. 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of prices and the number of traders by 
strategies in EXP.2. 
3.3.3 Introduction of Mimetic Traders 
We will observe price dynamics in the presence of 
mimetic traders (section 2.4.4), to see if their 
mimetism will lead to diffusion of speculative 
behaviour in the market, and formation of bubbles, 
such as reported in the literature (e.g. (Orléan, 1989) 
and (Chang, 2014)). 
In EXP.3 when population of traders is 
composed from 70% of mimetic traders and 10% of 
noises, fundamentalists and hybrid traders. We can 
see in Table 3 that RD=0,123 is significantly positive 
and the same for Boom and Burst duration, which 
indicates a significant deviation of price from 
fundamental value. The test reject the three null 
hypothesis which indicate that a deviation of prices 
from fundamental values has the magnitude of 
speculative bubble (Figure 6(a)) such as in EXP.2 
when population is composed from 80% of hybrids. 







































































(a) Prices and Fund. values






































 Figure: 6 Evolution of prices and the number of traders by 
strategies in EXP.3. 
Figure 6 (b) represents the number of traders for 
each strategy as function of time. We can see that 
the majority of trader’s deviate to speculative 
strategy during the period when prices increase, in 
fact, 10% of hybrid traders switch to speculative 
behaviour due to the uptrend in prices, and then the 
vast majority of mimetic imitate speculative 
decisions of hybrids, and thus become speculators as 
can be seen in Figure 7 (a) and Figure 7 (b). Figure 7 
(c) shows that the weights average of mimetic 
interactions with hybrids ெܹுതതതതതand mimetic ெܹெതതതതതare 
largely greater than those of fundamentalists ெܹிതതതതത and 
noises ெܹேതതതതത. This indicates that mimetic traders tend 
to imitate hybrids or other mimetic traders.  
 
Figure 7: Evolution of mimetic traders by (a) trader types 
(b) strategies, and (c) weight averages of interactions with 
mimetic traders in EXP.3. 
In other word, speculative behaviour first 
contaminates mimetic traders that interact with 
hybrid traders, and then gradually contaminates 
other mimetic traders which don’t interact directly 
with the hybrids. This corresponds exactly to the 
mimetic contagion, which causes the phenomenon of 
the bubble as described in the literature (e.g. 
(Orléan, 1989) and (Chang, 2014)). 
Finally, for better understand the behaviour of 
traders, and interactions between them, we have 
used Gephi tool (Bastian, 2009) to visualize a 
traders, their types and investment strategies, and 
their interactions in different periods of simulation. 
Figure 8 present visualizations of traders and 
their interactions in 4 key periods of experiments 
EXP.3. A stickman represents a trader; colours 
represent   their   investment  strategies. To visualize 
Table 3: Means of observed bubble measures, and test of 
null hypothesis significance in performed experiments. (*) 
indicates that null hypothesis is rejected. 
EXP.1 EXP.2 EXP.3
Boom 2 41 30 
Burst 2 21 12 
RD 0,001 0,194 0,123 
PD 20 k 1043 k 471 k 
ND 17 k 2 k 7 k 
H0 : ܴܦ ൑ Ͳ p>0,05 p<0,05* p<0,05*
H0 : ܤ݋݋݉ ൑ ܤݑݎݏݐ p>0,05 p<0,05* p<0,05*
H0 : ܲܦ ൑ ܰܦ p>0,05 p<0,05* p<0,05*
 
Figure 8: Visualization of traders and their interactions 
network in EXP.3. 
interactions network, we applied the Force Atlas 
algorithm, which pulls together nodes connected 
with strong interactions, while repelling away all 
other nodes. This provides a much more readable 
representation of the graph. 
Before the start of the simulation, we can see 
that the market is populated by a majority of mimics 
(grey stickman), with 10% noises (brown stickman), 
10% of fundamentalists (blue stickman), and 10% of 
hybrids, initially use fundamentalist strategy (sky 
blue stickman). 
After 300 transactions, all hybrid traders chose 
speculative strategy (in red), when mimetic traders 
are divided between fundamental strategy (in green), 
speculative strategy (in violet) and noise decision (in 
yellow). They haven’t preference for a particular 
strategy. 



































(a) Prices and Fund. values

























































































































































Noise trader  
Fundamentalist trader 
Hybrid with fundamental strategy 
Hybrid with speculative strategy
 
In the beginning (time 0) After 300 transactions (time 1879) 
After 500 transactions (time 4219) After 800 transactions (time 5041) 
Mimetic with noise strategy 
Mimetic with fundamental strategy 
Mimetic without strategy 
Mimetic with speculative strategy
After 500 transactions, the mimetic approach 
each other, and with hybrid traders, indicating a high 
weights of interactions between them. Thus, the 
majority of mimetic traders imitate speculative 
decisions of hybrids, which leads to the formation of 
a bubble. 
After 800 transactions, mimetic traders always 
have strong interactions between them and with 
hybrid traders, the majority of mimetic traders 
switch to fundamentalist behaviour with hybrids, 
which causes the crash. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we introduced an agent based model of 
double auction market with heterogeneous traders 
and a social network of interactions. The market is 
populated by different types of traders, namely, (1) 
noise traders which represent misinformed traders in 
the market, (2) fundamental traders which make 
their decisions based on their estimate of the 
fundamental value, (3) hybrids which represent 
traders able to switch to speculative behaviour when 
they detect an uptrend in prices, and finally, (4) 
mimetic traders which take decisions by imitating 
their successors in interactions network. 
To test the model, we conducted a series of 
experiments and compared statistical properties of 
generated prices series with those of real market, and 
also, we tested theoretical assumptions which 
consider mimetic traders as the first explanation of 
the phenomena of speculative bubble. Experiments 
have shown that prices series generated have statistic 
properties close to those of real prices series. Also, 
results of experiments support theoretical 
assumption concerning the important role of 
mimicking behaviour as an explanation of excess 
volatility and bubbles formation. In fact, when 
market is populated by a majority of mimetic 
traders, they choose to imitate speculative decisions, 
resulting in price volatility and the formation of a 
bubble. 
The proposed model provides access to all the 
information concerning the decisions of traders, their 
strategies and their interactions; this will have to 
provide a more efficient way to study the mimicking 
behaviour and its role on financial markets. 
Regarding the perspective, we will improve the 
model through the development of agents that better 
simulate the behaviour of traders in real markets. 
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